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This article examines the approach of the High Court to the admissibility of novel scientific expert 
evidence in R v Calder. In Calder, Tipping J establishes a "gatekeeping" role for judges which 
requires them to test novel scientific evidence for relevance and reliability.  The article compares 
that approach with the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.  The implications of such a test are considered.  Although the 
Court of Appeal has not considered the issues raised in Calder, the article concludes that the 
approach is the most suitable one for New Zealand. 
I THE APPROACH IN CALDER 
A Facts and Previous Case Law 
In the case of R v Calder, 1 Dr Vicky Calder was charged with attempting to murder 
her ex­partner, Professor David Lloyd, by poisoning him with acrylamide.  The Court 
was asked by the defence, in a pre­trial application, to rule on the admissibility of the 
results of a scientific technique which analysed Professor Lloyd's hair for traces of CEC, 
which is a by­product of acrylamide.  The defence objected to the admission of the hair 
analysis, claiming that the analysis amounted to a scientific experiment and should be 
excluded as unreliable novel scientific evidence.  The defence submitted that the "area of 
* This paper was submitted as part of the LLB (Hons) programme at Victoria University of 
Wellington, 1997. 
1 Unreported, 12 April 1995, High Court, Christchurch Registry, T 154/94.
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expertise" rule applied to the evidence and that the evidence should be excluded on the 
basis that its prejudicial effect exceeded its probative value. 
Prior to the 1980s, expert evidence in New Zealand (as in Australia and England) was 
generally allowed to go before the trier of fact as long as it was relevant, offered by a 
qualified expert and did not offend one of the traditionally recognised rules of evidence. 2 
A rule excluding novel scientific evidence was not recognised.  However, since the 1980s, 
a number of admissibility decisions, in both New Zealand and Australia, have addressed 
the potentially prejudicial nature of expert scientific evidence. 3 
Freckelton states that these admissibility decisions show the development of a rule 
which would exclude scientific evidence which was not based on a recognised "area of 
expertise". 4 Scientific theories and techniques which had not achieved sufficient 
acceptance within the relevant professional community have been excluded in these 
decisions.  In New Zealand, a version of the rule has been applied to novel psychological 
evidence.  Experts basing their opinions on such evidence have been required to 
demonstrate that the subject matter of their opinion is "a sufficiently recognised branch of 
science". 5 
In reaching his decision, however, Tipping J stated that there was no direct authority 
in New Zealand dealing with the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. 6 He had been 
referred to the cases 7 which dealt with the admissibility of novel scientific evidence 
offered by psychologists and psychiatrists, but did not consider them to be of any 
assistance due to their different subject matter.  He therefore considered academic writing 
and the approach of other common law jurisdictions to determine what principles should 
apply when scientific evidence is challenged. 
Tipping J found the approach of the North American courts useful and discussed the 
United States Supreme Court case of Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 8 at some 
length. 9 In Daubert the Supreme Court ruled that the Frye 10 test, which required a novel 
2 I Freckelton and H Selby Expert Evidence (Loose­leaf ed, Law Book Company, Australia, 1993) 1­ 
2221. 
3 See, for example, R v B [1987] 1 NZLR 362. 
4 The "area of expertise" rule is discussed in  Freckelton and Selby above n 2, 1­2221. 
5 Above n 3, 367. 
6 Above n 1, 5. 
7 R v B, above n 3; R v Accused [1989] 1 NZLR 714; R v CS (1993) 11 CRNZ 45; R v R (1994) CRNZ 402. 
8 (1993) 125 L Ed 2d 469. 
9 Above n 1, 4.
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scientific technique or theory to have gained general acceptance in the field to which it 
belonged, had been replaced by a new test which required the judge to play a 
"gatekeeping" role with regard to expert scientific testimony.  Judges should no longer 
rely on general acceptance to determine reliability but must assess the reliability of expert 
scientific testimony for themselves.  Criteria for assessing the reliability of scientific 
testimony were discussed in Daubert. 
The Judge also discussed the Victorian case of Lucas. 11 This decision emphasised the 
need for caution in admitting scientific evidence, as it may appear to the jury to have an 
overwhelming appearance of validity.  However, Tipping J focused on a quote in the 
judgment from US v Baller, 12 which suggested that the danger of a scientific opinion 
having undue weight with the jury could be countered by requiring a demonstrable, 
objective procedure for reaching the opinion and qualified witnesses who could duplicate 
the result or criticise the means by which it was reached. Scientific evidence need only be 
excluded where there was an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular 
technique.  Otherwise, relevant scientific evidence should be admitted in the same 
manner as other expert testimony and its weight tested by cross­examination and 
refutation. 
Finally, the Judge considered the Law Commission's discussion paper on opinion and 
expert evidence. 13 This paper had discussed the need to assess scientific evidence for 
scientific reliability, including the validity of the underlying theory and the reliability of 
the procedures and techniques used in the particular case. 14 The Law Commission 
concluded that "a theory need not be accepted by all or most scientists working in the 
relevant area". 15 While idiosyncratic and unsatisfactory theories must be guarded 
against, it considered that theories which were newly developed or which represented the 
views of a minority might still be reliable and helpful. 16 
10 Frye v United States (DC Cir. 1923) 293 F 1013. 
11 [1992] 2 VR 109. 
12 (1975) 519 Fed 2d 463. 
13 New Zealand Law Commission Evidence Law: Expert Evidence and Opinion Evidence ­ Preliminary 
Paper No 18 (Law Commission, Wellington, 1991). 
14 Above n 1, 6. 
15 As cited in Calder, above n 1, 6. 
16 Above n 1, 6.
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B The Calder Test 
Drawing on the case law and reform options, Tipping J developed a test for the 
admissibility of novel scientific evidence. 17 First, the proponent of such evidence must be 
a suitably qualified person.  Second, the evidence must be shown to be both relevant and 
helpful.  To be relevant, the evidence must logically tend to show that a fact in issue is 
more or less likely.  To be helpful, the evidence must pass a threshold test which Tipping 
J called the "minimum threshold of reliability". 18 This means that the party offering the 
expert evidence (the "proponent") must demonstrate that it has a sufficient claim to 
reliability to be admitted.  If the judge is satisfied that the evidence is sufficiently reliable, 
the evidence may be admitted at trial.  Its probative value can then be tested by cross­ 
examination and counter evidence and is a matter for the jury to determine.  Under this 
approach, evidence which has been shown to be relevant and sufficiently reliable may 
still, however, be excluded if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. 19 
The proponent of the evidence must establish expertise, relevancy and helpfulness, 
and also demonstrate that the evidence is more probative than prejudicial.  The Judge did 
not explicitly refer to the standard of proof, but said that any real doubt should be 
resolved in favour of exclusion.  At first sight, this seems to suggest that the standard is 
beyond reasonable doubt.  However, the standard of proof with regard to preliminary 
facts is usually the balance of probabilities. 20 It is therefore more likely that the judge is 
merely required to be satisfied that the evidence is relevant and helpful.  This does not 
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, simply that the judge makes up his or her mind 
on the issue. 21 
Tipping J anticipated criticism that a test requiring "a sufficient claim to reliability" 
may be too general to be of assistance. 22 However, he justified his test by pointing to its 
flexibility which would enable it to be applied to different types of novel scientific 
evidence.  The test could also be supplemented by appropriate factors drawn from the 
case law.  He suggested that it may be useful to consider the factors outlined in the 
17 Above n 1, 7. 
18 Above n 1, 7. 
19 Above n 1, 7. 
20 DL Mathieson (ed) Cross on Evidence (NZ Loose­leaf ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1996) 119­1; 
Police v Anderson [1972] NZLR 233 (CA). 
21 In R v White (David), [1988] 1 NZLR 264, the Court of Appeal held that s 75(2) of the Criminal 
Justice Act, which required that a judge be satisfied that preventive detention is expedient for the 
protection of the public (a serious matter indeed), did not require proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, simply that the judge makes up his or her mind on the issue. 
22 Above n 1, 7.
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Canadian cases of Johnston 23 and Melaragni 24 (both decisions of the Ontario Court, 
General Division) when deciding whether the threshold had been crossed. 
II THE APPROACH IN DAUBERT 
A The Daubert Test 
The decision in Calder has much in common with the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Daubert.  The Daubert decision involved the rejection of the general 
acceptance test which Tipping J was invited, but declined, to apply in Calder.  A 
comparison between the two tests highlights both the strengths and weakness of the 
Calder decision. 
The Daubert decision is based upon the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) Rule 702 
which states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialised knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
23 In Johnston (1992) 69 CCC (3d) 395, 415, these were "(1) The potential rate of error. (2) The existence 
and maintenance of standards. (3) The care with which the scientific technique has been employed 
and whether it is susceptible to abuse. (4) Whether there are analogous relationships with other 
types of scientific techniques that are routinely admitted into evidence. (5) The presence of fail safe 
characteristics. (6) The expert's qualifications and stature. (7) The existence of specialised 
literature. (8) The novelty of the technique in its relationship to more established areas of scientific 
analysis. (9) Whether the technique has been generally accepted by experts in the field. (10) The 
nature and breadth of the inference adduced. (11) The clarity with which the technique may be 
explained. (12) The extent to which basic data may be verified by the court and jury. (13) The 
availability of other experts to evaluate the technique. (14) The probative significance of the 
evidence". 
24 In Melaragni (1992) 73 CCC (3d) 348, 353, these were "(1) Is the evidence likely to assist the jury in 
its fact finding mission, or is it likely to confuse and confound the jury? (2) Is the jury likely to be 
overwhelmed by the "mystic infallibility" of the evidence, or will the jury be able to keep an open 
mind and objectively assess the worth of the evidence? (3) Will the evidence, if accepted, 
conclusively prove an essential element of the crime which the defence is contesting, or is it simply 
a piece of evidence to be incorporated into a larger puzzle? (4) What degree of reliability has the 
proposed scientific technique or body of knowledge achieved? (5) Are there a sufficient number of 
experts available so that the defence can retain its own expert if desired? (6) Is the scientific 
technique or body of knowledge such that it can be independently tested by the defence? (7) Has 
the scientific technique destroyed the evidence upon which the conclusions have been based, or 
has the evidence been preserved for defence analysis if requested? (8) Are there clear policy or 
legal grounds which would render the evidence inadmissible despite its probative value? (9) Will 
the evidence cause undue delay or result in the needless presentation of cumulative evidence?".
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The Supreme Court ruled that under the FRE a federal trial judge must ensure that all 
scientific evidence is both relevant and reliable, and that, with regard to scientific 
evidence, evidentiary reliability is based on scientific validity. 25 
The Supreme Court inferred the reliability requirement from the interpretation of the 
term "scientific … knowledge" in rule 702.  The adjective "scientific" implies a grounding 
in the methods and procedure of science.  Similarly, the word "knowledge" connotes 
more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. 26 In order to determine whether 
the expert's testimony pertains to "scientific knowledge", the trial judge must assess 
"whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically 
valid". 27 The focus must be on the principles and methodology, not on the conclusions 
they generate. 28 
The Supreme Court also held that there should be a heightened relevance requirement 
for expert scientific evidence.  This was implicit in the rule 702 requirement that the 
expert evidence assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue.  In order for scientific evidence to be "helpful", the expert's opinion must relate to 
an issue that is actually in dispute and must provide a "valid scientific connection to the 
pertinent enquiry". 29 This requires an assessment of whether the "reasoning or 
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue". 30 
The Supreme Court offered some guidance to the lower courts to help them 
determine whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony was 
scientifically valid, and whether it could properly be applied to the facts in issue.  This 
guidance consisted of four criteria: whether the theory or technique could (and had) been 
tested; whether the theory or technique had been subjected to peer review and 
publication; the known or potential rate of error; and acceptance within the relevant 
scientific community.  However, the Court emphasised that this was not a definitive 
checklist or test. 31 
Finally, the Supreme Court pointed out that other rules may be applicable even if the 
expert evidence is admissible under rule 702.  In particular, rule 403, which permits the 
25 Above n 8, 470. 
26 Above n 8, 481. 
27 Above n 8, 482. 
28 Above n 8, 484. 
29 Above n 8, 482. 
30 Above n 8, 481. 
31 Above n 8, 482.
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exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury". 32 
B Daubert Compared to Calder 
Although Daubert was based on the interpretation of a relevant statute, Tipping J was 
strongly influenced by the decision.  He adopted the "gatekeeping" analogy of the 
Supreme Court 33 and the analysis which rejects the general acceptance test for court 
determined reliability. 34 Both courts created very general tests requiring relevance and 
reliability.  Both offered non­definitive criteria to determine reliability.  There are also, 
however, differences between the two cases. 
1 "Fit" 
Daubert sets a more stringent test for relevancy than that advocated by Tipping J. 
Calder requires only the usual "logical" relevancy.  To pass the relevancy test, the evidence 
need only show that a fact in issue is more or less likely. 35 In contrast, Daubert subjects 
scientific expert evidence to a heightened relevancy requirement.  The judge must inquire 
whether the reasoning or methodology employed by the expert can properly be applied 
to the facts in issue. 36 For example, studies that show that a particular chemical causes 
cancer in animals may not be sufficiently "relevant" to be admissible to prove that the 
same chemical causes cancer in humans. 37 There must be good grounds to extrapolate 
from animals to humans before the tests can be said to be relevant under Daubert. 38 The 
Supreme Court referred to this heightened relevancy requirement as "fit". 39 
It is possible to argue that a heightened relevance test is implicit in the Calder test. 
Expert evidence that is not closely related to the factors present in the case could be said 
to not be sufficiently reliable.  However, given that the Judge had considered Daubert in 
some detail, it is likely that he would have expressly referred to "fit" if he had intended it 
to be part of his test.  Thus, although Daubert is considered a liberal admissibility 
32 Above n 8, 484. 
33 Above n 1, 7. 
34 Above n 1, 7. 
35 Above n 1, 7. 
36 Above n 8, 481. 
37 In Re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation (CA3 1994) 35 F 3d 717, 743.  A post Daubert decision. 
38 Above n 37, 743. 
39 Above n 8, 481.
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standard, its heightened relevancy requirement makes it a stricter test than that set in 
Calder. 
This difference in standards can possibly be traced to the different legal environments 
of New Zealand and the United States.  Jury trials are much more common in the United 
States, where they are often used in civil cases as well as criminal cases. Professional 
experts are now an integral part of the United States litigation process.  Many see such 
experts as "hired guns" who will testify to whatever their client wishes. In civil cases, 
juries have given large awards to "deserving" plaintiffs on the basis of "junk" scientific 
evidence let in under a low admissibility standard. 40 This has led to greater concern in 
the United States over the admission of unreliable scientific evidence. 
In New Zealand, however, the small number of trials requiring scientific evidence will 
not support a "professional expert witness" class.  Expert witnesses have other jobs and 
are therefore perceived as being more independent.  Juries are not required to cope with 
scientific evidence in civil trials where they might be tempted to find for "deserving" 
plaintiffs on the basis of poor science.  Consequently, expert scientific witnesses are 
viewed with less suspicion in New Zealand and are not seen as needing regulation to the 
same extent as in the United States. 
The Law Commission has rejected suggestions that relevance should be accorded any 
meaning going beyond logical relevance. 41 It argues that a relevance inquiry going 
beyond logical relevancy is either an inquiry as to probative value or a device for 
excluding evidence which is unfairly prejudicial, misleading or time­wasting by 
comparison with its true worth. 42 Compressing these issues into one can result in 
conceptual confusion.  It is better to require the court to address them separately.  In as 
much as "fit" requires anything further than logical relevancy, it should not be 
incorporated into the test in Calder. 
2 Testability and application to the "soft" sciences 
In Daubert, the Supreme Court elevated one particular criteria for establishing 
reliability, "testability", which it described as "ordinarily a key question". 43 This 
highlights the Supreme Court's conception of science as an empirical endeavour in which 
testing a theory in order to prove it false plays a key role.  The Calder test, in contrast, 
40 For examples of such cases see P Huber Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom (Basic Books, 
USA, 1991) 42. 
41 Above n 13, 26. 
42 Above n 13, 26. 
43 Above n 8, 482.
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does not concentrate on testability, but refers to a much broader range of criteria 44 which 
focus on policy issues as well as scientific validity.  This suggests the Calder test should 
have a wider application than the Daubert test.  Interestingly, the opposite is the case. 
In the United States, there was confusion after Daubert as to whether the case applied 
to expert evidence from the social and behavioural sciences.  In the past, the federal 
courts had generally distinguished between "hard" science, such as DNA analysis and 
"soft" expertise, such as social science and mental health testimony. 45 However, Justice 
Blackmun's definition of science was so broad that it arguably included social and mental 
health science.  Consequently, lower federal courts have applied the case to determine the 
admissibility of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome evidence, 46 rape trauma 
syndrome evidence, 47 and psychological testimony about the unreliability of eyewitness 
identifications. 48 
The Daubert focus on "testability" makes it an unsuitable test for expert evidence based 
on the "soft" sciences.  Because these disciplines deal with human beings, they must 
employ methodologies which do not harm their subjects.  This may make falsifying a 
hypothesis impossible.  While scientists in these disciplines also experiment on animals, 
allowing more rigorous methodologies to be employed, these experiments are likely to 
fall foul of the Daubert "fit" requirement.  Consequently, the application of Daubert has 
usually resulted in the exclusion of expert testimony based on the "soft" sciences. 
The Calder test, in contrast, does not focus on whether a theory may be falsified.  The 
judge is directed to apply any criteria from the case law which is thought appropriate. 
This flexibility could allow the development of suitable criteria to test the methodology of 
"soft" science evidence.  However, because of Court of Appeal precedents on novel 
psychological evidence, 49 the Calder test is limited to "hard" science. 
44 Via the references to Johnston and Melaragni. 
45 E Imwinkelreid "Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The Far Reaching Implications of the Daubert 
Court's Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific Enterprise" (1995) 81 Iowa Law Review 55, 
69. 
46 State v Foret (La 1993) 628 So 2d 1116; Gier v Educational Service Unit No 16 (D Neb 1994) 845 F Supp 
1342. 
47 State v Alberico (NM 1993)861 P 2d 192. 
48 US v Amador­Galvan (9th Cir 1993) 9 F 3d 1414. 
49 Above n 7.
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3 Should the Calder test also apply to "soft" science? 
A single admissibility test for all forms of scientific evidence is supported by the Law 
Commission. 50 It proposes a "helpfulness" test (almost identical to that in Calder) 
applicable to all forms of expert evidence. 51 It is submitted that a reliability test should 
apply to all forms of expert evidence purported to be based on scientific research.  The 
dangers of putting unreliable evidence with an aura of scientific infallibility before a jury 
exist for both "hard" and "soft" science.  However, the criteria for assessing reliability 
should differ according to the type of science involved. 
A possible criterion for a judge to apply in deciding if a theory based on "soft" science 
research is sufficiently reliable is whether there are any avoidable methodological 
weaknesses in the study.  For example, in research into the effects of child sexual abuse it 
is not possible to test a theory by abusing one sample of children and comparing the 
results with a non­abused control group. 52 However, it is possible to compare studies of 
children known to have been abused with a group of children whom the researcher is 
reasonably sure have not been abused.  Further, the study may have focused on a 
particular group of children or a particular type of abuser.  Thus, the evidence would not 
be reliable if used to comment on persons outside of those groups.  The size of the group 
studied and its method of selection could also have a bearing on reliability.  Peer review 
and general acceptance would also provide an indication of whether the research was 
sound. 
Reliability should also depend on the purpose for which the expert evidence is being 
offered.  It may be shown to be sufficiently reliable for one purpose but not another.  For 
example, rape trauma syndrome was developed from a study of the behaviour of women 
known to have been raped.  Thus, it is sufficiently reliable to be helpful when the expert 
witness is giving evidence about the ways a woman who has been raped might behave. 
However, it may be judged insufficiently reliable to support an expert opinion that a 
woman had been raped.  Such an assertion would have to be based on research that had 
eliminated other possible causes of the symptoms observed in the women who were the 
subject of the study. 
Such admissibility decisions would depend on the judge weighing up the 
probative/prejudicial effects of the testimony.  Some commentators argue that juries are 
50 Above n 13, 21. 
51 Above n 13, 21. 
52 LR Askowitz and MH Graham "The Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual 
Abuse Prosecutions" (1994) 15 Cardozo Law Review 2027, 2040.
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better able to evaluate "soft" science evidence as opposed to "hard" science evidence. 53 
Consequently, there is less need to shield the jury from such evidence. 
53 D McCord "Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility 
of Non­Traditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases" (1987) 66 Oregon Law Review 19, 
183.
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4 Should all scientific evidence be screened? 
Another possible difference between Calder and Daubert is that the Daubert test applies 
to all scientific evidence not just novel scientific evidence. 54 In Calder, the objection to the 
evidence was couched in terms of it being novel scientific evidence. 55 Tipping J stated 
that the test applied to "scientific evidence, such as that in issue in this case". 56 This could 
be read broadly or narrowly. 
The Calder test should apply to all scientific evidence.  The general acceptance test, by 
definition, only applied to novel scientific evidence.  However, there is no logical reason 
for limiting a judicial assessment of reliability to evidence based on novel science. 
Scientific techniques which had been previously accepted in court and were no longer 
novel scientific evidence have been ruled inadmissible under Daubert because they have 
subsequently been demonstrated to be unreliable. 57 This result should also occur under 
Calder. 
III CONSIDERATION OF THE CALDER APPROACH 
A The General Acceptance and Judicial Assessment Tests Compared 
In the past, New Zealand courts were content to admit relevant scientific evidence as 
long as the expert was qualified.  In cases where concern has been voiced regarding novel 
scientific (psychological) evidence, judges have relied on a version of the general 
acceptance test to decide admissibility. 58 The decision in Calder, which marks a move 
toward judicial assessment, makes it timely to compare the two tests. 
The main benefit of the general acceptance test is that it provides a relatively quick 
method of determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence.  Being a 
conservative standard, it is said to provide greater assurance of reliability than other 
tests. 59 It also ensures that there will be a pool of experts who could be called upon to 
54 However, the court noted that once a scientific theory became firmly established and developed 
into what the court termed "scientific law" it would be subject to judicial notice and would not be 
subject to an admissibility test.  See Daubert, above n 8, n 11. 
55 Above n 1, 3. 
56 Above n 1, 7. 
57 United States v Posado (5th Cir. 1995) 57 F 3d 428. 
58 The subject matter of the expert opinion was required to be a sufficiently recognised branch of 
science at the time the evidence was given. R v B, above n 3, 367. 
59 PC Gianelli "The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v United States, a Half Century 
Later" (1980) 80 Columbia Law Review 1197, 1207.
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testify with regard to the scientific evidence. 60 Supporters claim this test promotes 
consistency of decision making. 61 
However, the general acceptance test may not be easy to apply.  There may not be a 
consensus in the relevant scientific community concerning a particular issue.  There may 
also be difficulties in even determining who constitutes the relevant scientific 
community. 62 In applying the Frye rule in the United States, judges were tempted to 
manipulate the concepts of either scientific community or general acceptance to exclude 
or admit evidence. 63 This manipulation has prevented general acceptance from 
providing a consistent standard of admissibility in the United States. A requirement of 
general acceptance also prevents relevant and reliable evidence from going before the fact 
finder merely because it is new. 64 Scientific work performed for the purposes of litigation 
will therefore often be inadmissible. 65 Further, commentators have challenged the claim 
that the test provides an assurance of reliability, as general acceptance of a theory does 
not guarantee empirical validation. 66 
The benefit of the judicial assessment approach is that it permits a greater degree of 
relevant and reliable scientific evidence to go before the fact finder.  Such evidence will 
not be excluded merely because it is new.  However, being a less stringent standard than 
the general acceptance test, less reliable material may be presented to a jury.  Critics claim 
that ignorant juries are unable to correctly assess the "junk science" that is allowed in 
under a lower reliability standard than the general acceptance test. 67 The judicial 
60 Above n 59, 1207. 
61 JL Brown "DNA and Kelly­Frye: Who will Survive in California?" (1988) 11 Criminal Justice Journal 
1, 27. 
62 Above n 59, 1208. 
63 EJ Chan "The 'Brave New World' of Daubert: True Peer Review, Editorial Peer Review, and 
Scientific Validity" (1995) 70 New York University Law Review 100. 
64 EJ Imwinkelreid "A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence: A Primer on Evaluating the 
Weight of Scientific Evidence" (1981) 23 William and Mary Law Review 261. 
65 For instance, in the Daubert case the defendant wished to offer in evidence a statistical re­analysis 
of the published epidemiological studies offered as proof by the plaintiff.  Although the re­analysis 
was performed by a highly qualified and reputable expert, it was inadmissible as it had not been 
published or subject to peer review and therefore could not be said to have been accepted by the 
scientific community.  However, the fact that the re­analysis was unpublished did not necessarily 
mean it was unreliable, although clearly it is a factor to take into account in making such a 
determination. 
66 L Etlinger "Social Science Research in Domestic Violence Law: A Proposal to Focus on Evidentiary 
Use" (1995) 58 Albany Law Review 1259, 1279. 
67 PW Huber "Junk Science in the Courtroom" (1992) 29 Val U L Rev 723.
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assessment test has also been criticised for having unrealistic expectations of judges' 
abilities to assess scientific evidence and for requiring them to become "amateur 
scientists". 68 Further, the test will consume more judicial time and resources as judges 
will have to come to grips with the evidence themselves.  It will also be more costly for 
litigants. 
1 Can juries cope with scientific evidence? 
Freckelton has questioned the supposed inability of juries to cope with scientific 
evidence, and, therefore, the need to shield them with overly strict reliability tests. 69 
There has, however, been little empirical testing of the ability of juries to understand 
expert evidence.  Two studies conducted in the United States indicated that juries could 
not cope with scientific testimony and would take irrelevant factors, such as the experts' 
appearance, into account. 70 However, these studies have been criticised by Freckelton as 
being little more than anecdotal or arising out of a single and unusual case. 71 A later 
Hong Kong study indicated 22 out of 58 jurors experienced difficulties in a complex trial, 
but these difficulties were due to a number of factors not all of which related to expert 
evidence. 72 
Freckleton concludes that the empirical information available about the difficulties 
encountered by jurors in understanding expert evidence specifically is extremely limited 
in both extent and quality.  His conclusions have been supported by later studies.  Jacobs 
notes that recent surveys support the conclusion that jurors are capable of deciding 
complex scientific issues. 73 Indeed, jurors may give less weight to scientific expert 
evidence than to evidence obtained through personal understanding. 74 Vidmar and 
Schuller, after reviewing studies on the effect of expert "social framework" testimony on 
jurors, conclude that jurors are not overwhelmed by such testimony. 75 Thus, there is no 
68 Above n 8, 487. 
69 I Freckelton "The Egg Shell Jury and the Expert Evidence Conundrum", a paper delivered at the 
Australian Law Commission Conference on Expert Evidence, 1993.  On file with the author. 
70 Forkosch "The Lie Detector and the Courts" (1938) 16 New York University Law Quarterly 202; P 
Rosenthal "Nature of Jury Response to the Expert Witness" (1983) 28 Journal of Forensic Sciences 
528, cited above in Freckleton, n 86, 145. 
71 Above n 69, 145. 
72 Above n 69, 146. 
73 M Jacobs "Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate about Scientific Evidence: A Closer 
Look at Juror Incompetence and Scientific Objectivity" (1993) 25 Conn L Rev 1083. 
74 Above n 73, 1098. 
75 N Vidmar and R Schuller "Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony" (1989) 52 
Law and Contemporary Problems 133, 173.
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strong empirical support for the often expressed judicial fear that juries will be 
overwhelmed by "shaky" scientific evidence and will give it more credibility than it 
deserves. 
Freckelton also contends that those rules of expert evidence which help the fact finder 
to evaluate expert evidence (area of expertise, qualification rule and factual basis rule) are 
being applied with increasing stringency by the courts. 76 In contrast, those rules which 
arose out of concern to protect jurors from being intimidated and overwhelmed by expert 
evidence (the common knowledge rule and the ultimate issue rule) are being relaxed.  He 
sees this as a move toward greater confidence in the abilities of juries.  Freckelton is an 
Australian and no doubt his comments reflect principally on developments within that 
country.  Nevertheless, to a considerable extent, they also hold true for New Zealand. 77 
2 Should New Zealand judges be "gatekeepers"? 
The "gatekeeping" role assigned to judges by Calder and Daubert puts a heavy burden 
on the judiciary.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Daubert, said that the task 
imposed on trial judges by the majority judgment involved "matters far afield from the 
expertise of judges" and required them to become "amateur scientists". 78 Others have 
argued that to implement Daubert, judges will have to achieve at least a basic level of 
scientific literacy involving an understanding of the scientific method, the rudiments of 
statistics and probability theory, and an appreciation of error factors and of the 
limitations of frequently used methods of observation, measurement and detection. 79 
This will require a considerable investment of time and resources as judges and lawyers 
will not develop an understanding of the nature of science without a major educational 
and training effort. 
The response to Daubert in the United States has been to try to educate judges to 
enable them to cope with the task of assessing the reliability of scientific evidence.  A 
reference manual of scientific evidence was published by the Federal Judicial Centre in 
1994 to assist judges in implementing effective management of expert evidence involving 
scientific issues. 80 Some scientific organisations and universities are conducting 
76 Above n 69, 166. 
77 For example, in A­G v Equitycorp Industries Group Ltd (in statutory management) [1995] 2 NZLR 135, 
the Court of Appeal doubted that the ultimate issue rule was still an absolute rule.  In R v Decha­ 
Iamsukun [1993] 1 NZLR 141, the Court of Appeal said that expert evidence was admissible even if 
the matter in question was to a considerable extent within the experience of the fact finder. 
78 Above n 8, 487. 
79 P Miller, B Rein and E Bailey "Daubert and the Need for Judicial Scientific Literacy" (1994) 77 
Judicature 254. 
80 Work on the Reference Manual actually began prior to Daubert. However, the decision encouraged
414 (1998) 28 VUWLR 
education programmes for judges on scientific issues and mathematics. Special training 
seminars for applying Daubert were organised for New York trial judges. 
Unfortunately, there has not been a similar response in New Zealand.  Judicial 
education is organised by the Department for Courts.  No training is offered as a matter 
of course with regard to expert scientific evidence.  However, judges may attend 
externally organised courses. 
One method of helping judges cope with assessing the reliability of scientific evidence 
is the appointment of court experts.  This was suggested by the Supreme Court in 
Daubert 81 and has also been proposed by the Law Commission. 82 The use of court experts 
may appear to go against the requirement that judges determine reliability themselves. 
However, such an expert could be used to explain concepts to the judge rather than 
acting a surrogate decision maker. 83 It would be part of the judge's educational process 
rather than an abdication of responsibility.  Parties would remain free to lead their own 
experts and thus to counter any perceived deficiencies or bias on the part of the court­ 
appointed expert. 
3 The resource implications of Calder 
It seems undeniable that a judicial assessment test will consume more time and 
resources than a general acceptance test.  The relatively quick investigation of the status 
of a particular area of science will be replaced by time consuming hearings as to the 
reliability of new theories and techniques.  There may be disputes over scientific evidence 
that parties would never bother leading under a general acceptance test.  Nevertheless, a 
judicial assessment test in conjunction with procedural reform may reduce areas of 
disagreement, and thus reduce some costs. 
4 The procedural implications of Calder 
Under a judicial assessment test, experts will require sufficient time to investigate and 
test the challenged evidence.  American commentators have recognised the need for a 
more sophisticated disclosure regime in the wake of Daubert. 84 The Law Commission has 
the continuation and rapid completion of the project. 
81 Above n 8, 484. 
82 Above n 13, 37. 
83 In "Improving Judicial Gatekeeping: Technical Advisors and Scientific Evidence" (1997) 110 
Harvard Law Review 941, 947, it was suggested that procedures should be developed by the 
courts to prevent the judges from delegating their "gatekeeping" role to the expert. 
84 MA Berger "Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test" (1994) 78 Minn L Rev 1345, 
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also recognised the need for procedural reform as a part of the changes it proposes for 
the admissibility of expert evidence. 85 The Law Commission's proposals were a strong 
influence on Tipping J and the test in Calder closely resembles its recommendations. 
The Law Commission proposes that opposing parties should have sufficient notice of 
expert evidence to enable them to investigate and test the evidence fully.  The proposed 
rule 86 would require parties to give notice to each other, in advance of the trial, of the 
expert evidence they intended to call.  The notice would include the name, address and 
qualifications of the proposed witness and the substance of the proposed evidence. 
Notice would be mandatory with the court having power to exclude unnotified evidence. 
Such procedural reforms are necessary to ensure a fair process under the Calder test. 
New rules must ensure opposing experts are adequately prepared to test the scientific 
evidence, both at the admissibility hearing and (if the evidence is admitted) at trial. 
Procedural reform would add to trial efficiency by facilitating quick identification of the 
real issues and encouraging opposing experts to narrow their differences prior to trial. 
This would save time and reduce costs for both the judicial system and for litigants. 
IV CONCLUSION 
Although Calder has not been considered by the Court of Appeal, it is submitted that 
it is the most suitable approach for establishing the admissibility of scientific evidence.  It 
provides a flexible test for ensuring that relevant and reliable scientific evidence is 
admissible, taking into account both scientific validity and policy factors.  The general 
acceptance test, in contrast, has been found wanting by the jurisdiction which developed 
it and replaced with a test similar to that of Calder.  Use of the Calder test will, however, 
require concurrent procedural reforms because opposing parties will need adequate 
notice to enable them to adequately test the evidence.  It will also require a willingness in 
the judicial system to invest time and resources in educating judges so as to enable  them 
to competently assess complex scientific evidence. 
Calder illustrates the growing significance of scientific evidence in the justice system. 
Science is a powerful tool which can greatly aid the fact finder.  However, it can also 
powerfully mislead the fact finder.  The decision to "gatekeep" demonstrates a desire to 
make full and appropriate use of such evidence without abdicating judicial power and 
responsibility to the expert scientific witness. 
85 Above n 13, 40. 
86 Above n 13, 52, rule 5.
